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Race, Islamophobia and the politics of citizenship
in post-uniﬁcation Germany
ALEKSANDRA LEWICKI
ABSTRACT In the immediate aftermath of German reuniﬁcation, as in the wake of the
recent humanitarian crisis, Germany experienced notable ‘peaks’ of racist agitation
and violence. In the 1990s, as today, the post-Communist eastern regions of
Germany tend to be perceived as the hub of such racism. In this article, Lewicki
revisits both ‘peaks’ via an examination of numerical evidence for verbal and
physical racist violence in the former East and West of Germany. Rather than
conceiving of racism as ‘cyclical’ or a speciﬁc legacy of the Communist dictatorship,
her analysis suggests that political projects in Germany’s past and present have
retained distinct structural incarnations of race. Far-right activists could thus
successfully channel animosities resulting from the terms of uniﬁcation into
nationalist and racist resentment: momentarily more so in the East, but increasingly
also in the West. The politics of citizenship, Lewicki argues, has provided a key
means of perpetuating, reafﬁrming and cementing racialized hierarchies in the two
post-war German states, but also in reuniﬁed Germany.
KEYWORDS asylum, citizenship, Germany, humanitarian crisis, Islamophobia, race,
racism, refugees
Reﬂecting on the contours of race in Europe, David Theo Goldbergobserved that the Muslim ﬁgured as ‘death’s delivery man’.1 Viewed as
inevitably hostile, aggressive and engaged in a jihad against Europe, the
Muslim represents the threat of cultural demise and, as the bearer of violent
destruction, the ‘monster of our time’.2 Goldberg’s essay, published in 2006,
concluded: ‘How much longer is it to go from cultural animalization to the
burning down of mosques than it was to go from the bestialization of Jews
to Kristallnacht?’3 By drawing analogies between contemporary Islamophobia
and pre-SecondWorldWar antisemitism, Goldberg warned of the potential of
anti-Muslim racism to escalate further in Europe’s future.
Many thanks to Ivan Kalmar for initiating and shaping the conversation about Islamopho-
bia in the East of the European Union, and thanks to the participants of the workshop in
Prague (October 2016) for great discussions and feedback.
1 David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 2,
2006, 331–64 (347).
2 Ibid., 346.
3 Ibid., 348.
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In the period following reuniﬁcation in Germany, the country experienced a
notable ‘peak’ in expressions of racist views, and a series of assaults against
asylum shelters; mosques were not yet a regular target of such attacks in
the 1990s. Today, Goldberg’s scenario seems worryingly prophetic: by 2016,
about half of the German population supported anti-Muslim views, while
an average of two attacks per week were directed at mosques, and assaults
on refugee facilities rose to eighteen per week.4 In the immediate post-uniﬁca-
tion period, as today, the post-Communist eastern regions of Germany tended
to be perceived as the hub of such racism.
Research has highlighted the legacy of the socialist republic, which nurtured
authoritarianism in its citizens,5 and also pointed to the destabilizing effects of
the transition from a Communist dictatorship to a democratic capitalist
economy, which triggered status anxieties and a sense of relative collective
deprivation.6 Migration scholars have emphasized the impact of the politics
of asylum since uniﬁcation.7 Historians have argued that the East German
government’s limited preparedness to engage critically with the population’s
involvement in Nazi crimes enabled the continuation of a ‘racist mindset’.8
Although these analyses mention that racism also thrives in former West
Germany, their main attention is directed at explaining right-wing extremist
attitudes or practices in the former East. They often either implicitly or expli-
citly conceive of racism as ‘cyclical’, thus appearing and disappearing, or ‘cul-
turalize’ racism by relating it to a ‘backward’mindset rooted in East German
4 Government responses to parliamentary questions (Antworten der Bundesregierung),
including ‘Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimische Straftaten im ersten Quartal 2016’,
29 April 2016, Document 18/8290; ‘Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimische Straftaten
im zweiten Quartal 2016’, 1 August 2016, Document 18/9310; ‘Islamfeindlichkeit und
antimuslimische Straftaten im dritten Quartal 2016’, 14 November 2016, Document
18/10322; ‘Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimische Straftaten im vierten Quartal
2016’, 10 February 2017, Document 18/11128; and ‘Proteste gegen und Übergriffe auf
Flüchtlingsunterkünfte im vierten Quartal 2016’, 22 February 2017, Document 18/
11298; all available on the Deutscher Bundestag website at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/
doc/btd/18/082/1808290.pdf, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/093/1809310.pdf,
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/103/1810322.pdf, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/
btd/18/111/1811128.pdf, and http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/112/1811298.pdf,
respectively (viewed 21 September 2018).
5 For example, Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler, ‘Autoritäre Dynamiken: Ergebnisse der
bisherigen “Mitte”-Studien und Fragestellung’, in Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess and
Elmar Brähler (eds), Die enthemmte Mitte: Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellung in
Deutschland. Die Leipziger ‘Mitte’-Studie 2016 (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag 2016), 11–21.
6 Anna Klein and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ‘Ost-westdeutsche Integrationsbilanz’, Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschichte, no. 28, 2009, 16–21.
7 Patrick R. Ireland, ‘Socialism, uniﬁcation policy and the rise of racism in Eastern
Germany’, International Migration Review, vol. 31, no. 3, 1997, 541–68.
8 Jan C. Behrends and Patrice G. Poutrus, ‘Xenophobia in the former GDR: explorations
and explanations from a historical perspective’, in Wojciech Burszt, Sebastian Wojcie-
chowski and Tomasz Kamusella (eds), Nationalisms across the Globe: An Overview of
Nationalisms in State-endowed and Stateless Nations (Poznań: Wyższa Szkoła Nauk
Humanistycznych i Dziennikarstwa 2006), 155–70.
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traditions of order and discipline.9 Many of these studies have little to say
about how and why racism persists in Germany’s western regions. This is a
serious lacuna as anti-Muslim racism has recently gained disproportionate
virulence across the country.
Some of the scholarship on Islamophobia in Germany takes us beyond this
reductive understanding of anti-Muslim racism as a cyclically ﬂowing indi-
vidual ‘attitude’ or relational ‘prejudice’. Tracing the longue durée of Oriental-
ism,10 this literature links anti-Muslim racist discourses to Germany’s Nazi
legacy,11 the late emergence of the German nation-state and Germany’s colo-
nial aspirations.12 Relating race to wider political projects, such as national-
ism, colonialism or the politics of memory, these perspectives also overcome
a culturalist lens that roots racism in a broadly conceived ‘mindset’. Analyses
of recent shifts in regulatory attention directed at Muslims have implicitly or
explicitly identiﬁed the politics of citizenship as a current political project that
advances the racialization of Muslims.13 However, what I think is missing
from accounts that trace anti-Muslim racism in Germany’s past and present
is a more explicit consideration of the country’s division during the twentieth
century and the effects of German reuniﬁcation.
In this article, I examine the dynamics of recent racist ‘peaks’ in post-uniﬁ-
cation Germany. I revisit previous research and numerical evidence of a spec-
trum of racist practices, including views expressed in surveys, electoral
choices, participation in marches and physical violence. Rather than reﬂecting
on the varied drivers of this diverse set of behaviours, I explore how these
actions were directed at speciﬁc targets in the 1990s and today.
As immigration numbers were rising in the 1990s, racist discourses mainly
focused on refugees and migrant workers whose markers of difference were
9 See Nitzan Shoshan, The Management of Hate: Nation, Affect, and the Governance of Right-
wing Extremism in Germany (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press
2016), 40.
10 Yasemin Shooman, ‘…weil ihre Kultur so ist’: Narrative des antimuslimischen Rassismus
(Bielefeld: transcript 2014).
11 Katherine Pratt Ewing, Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press 2008); Gabriele Dietze, ‘Okzidentalismuskritik: Möglichkeit-
en und Grenzen einer Forschungsperspektivierung’, in Gabriele Dietze, Claudia
Brunner and Edith Wenzel (eds), Kritik des Okzidentalismus: Transdisziplinäre Beiträge
zu (Neo)Orientalismus und Geschlecht (Bielefeld: transcript 2009), 23–54.
12 Iman Attia, Die ‘Westliche Kultur’ und ihr Anderes: Zur Dekonstruktion von Orientalismus
und antimuslimischem Rassismus (Bielefeld: transcript 2009); see also Dietze,
‘Okzidentalismuskritik’.
13 Schirin Amir-Moazami, ‘Zur Produktion loyaler Staatsbürger: Einbürgerungstests als
Instrument der Regulierung von religiös-kultureller Pluralität in Deutschland’, For-
schungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, vol. 29, no. 2, 2016, 21–33 (special issue: Bürgerschaft
in Europa: Grenzziehungen und soziale Bewegungen in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft, ed.
Aleksandra Lewicki); Aleksandra Lewicki, ‘The blind spots of liberal citizenship and
integration policy’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 51, no. 5, 2017, 375–95; Luis Manuel Her-
nández Aguilar, Governing Muslims and Islam in Contemporary Germany: Race, Time, and
the German Islam Conference (Leiden and Boston: Brill 2018).
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mainly ethnocultural. Racist violence was more frequent in the East, while
opinion polls reﬂected a more complex picture. In light of the recent increase
in immigration from conﬂict-ridden areas such as Syria, Libya andAfghanistan,
anti-Muslim racist practices have gained comparable virulence across Germany.
These developments, I suggest, show that the logics of race continue to
structure social relations in Germany. In the post-war era, the politics of
labour migration in East and West Germany racialized economic and political
hierarchies, and conveyed a sense of superior entitlement to the population.
The dynamics of reuniﬁcation added another layer of stratiﬁcation to
German society. In times of rising immigration, right-wing extremist activists
successfully appealed to post-uniﬁcation animosities andmobilized narratives
of a ‘loss of control’: momentarily more so in the East, but increasingly also in
the West. However, rather than addressing the underlying social inequalities,
or taking decisive measures against racist agitation and violence, the govern-
ment directed regulative attention to the movement and conduct of the Other.
In the 1990s, a notable sharpening of the boundaries of citizenship tamed the
outburst of racism. The current government similarly attempts to contain the
racist ‘peak’ by tightening immigration laws. The politics of citizenship, I thus
argue, provides a key means of perpetuating, reafﬁrming and cementing
racialized hierarchies. The rules of citizenship serve to stabilize a sense of
supremacy in the long term, while their sharpening enables a reassertion of
established privileges. Although I speciﬁcally focus on Germany, the obser-
vations I make about the politics of citizenship and the instrumentalization
of social disparities can also help us to understand the logics of race and
Islamophobia elsewhere in Europe.
Race and the politics of citizenship in East and West Germany
The history of racism shows that race is a shape shifter, and that racial sub-
jects have been made through a prism of diverse categorizations. The racia-
lization of bodies, as Salman Sayyid reminds us, was never exclusively
focused on visual markers: biology was ‘marked at the same time as religion,
culture, history and territories were marked and used to group socially fab-
ricated distinctions between Europeanness and non-Europeanness’.14
Racism’s varied conjunctures have been related to processes of political con-
tention as well as to the dynamics of capitalism.15 In Germany’s past and
present, race has materialized in various forms, including as the inferioriza-
tion of people of colour, which helped to legitimate German colonial
14 Salman Sayyid, ‘Out of the devils’ dictionary’, in Salman Sayyid and AbdoolKarim
Vakil (eds), Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives (London: Hurst 2010), 1–
18 (13).
15 Manuela Bojadžijev and Alex Demirović, ‘Vorwort’, in Alex Demirović and Manuela
Bojadžijev (eds), Konjunkturen des Rassismus (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot
2002), 7–27.
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expansion in, for example, Africa and China, as Orientalism, which assisted
in justifying Germany’s colonial aspirations in Turkey and the Middle East,
or as antisemitism and antizyganism, which served as pillars in the building
of the Third Reich.16
After the Second World War, the politics of immigration constituted one of
the main arenas in which the East and West German governments paid regu-
lative attention to race. Bridget Anderson argues that laws governing the
movement of subjects play a role in creating, hardening and legitimating
social hierarchies, and contribute to the manufacturing of racialized ethnic,
national and religious categories.17 The law and practice of citizenship, she
goes on, do not just give immigration ﬂows a particular character, but actively
produce social relations. Citizenship, so Anderson argues, is not only about
legal status but about status in the sense of worth and honour, and about
membership in the ‘community of value’. The politics of citizenship,
Nandita Sharma adds, positively racializes the members of the nation, and
negatively racializes Others.18 Relevant policy areas are thus the conditions
of entry, naturalization or integration, as well as the public contestation of
racism. Although the two German states adopted diverging regulatory
approaches to these matters, their politics of citizenship structurally sustained
the logics of race.
The problematization of the Third Reich, speciﬁcally the systematic exclu-
sion, prosecution and genocide of the Jewish population, has received con-
siderable public attention in West Germany. The Allies worked with
critical voices in the post-war Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to con-
front society with its involvement in Nazi crimes, including through criminal
prosecution, reparations, research, public commemoration and education.
Signiﬁcant parts of the population, however, also perceived these measures
as impositions by the winners of the Second World War. One of the results of
this process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (literally ‘coping with the past’) was
the FRG’s liberal post-war asylum regime. Despite their commitment to
receiving politically persecuted refugees, post-war elites stressed that the
FRG was ‘not a country of immigration’. They were, nevertheless, keen to
ﬁll shortages in industrial production, and signed recruitment agreements
with Greece, Italy, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia in the 1960s. By employing
so-called ‘guest workers’ in the lowest segment of the labour market,
employers were able to maintain relatively high wages for the German popu-
lation.19 Labour migrants were to help boost the economy and then return to
their home countries. They were barred from access to citizenship and voting
16 Volker Langbehn andMohammad Salama (eds), German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust
and Postwar Germany (New York: Columbia University Press 2011).
17 Bridget Anderson, Us & Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013), 35.
18 Nandita Sharma, ‘Racism’, in Bridget Anderson and Vanessa Hughes (eds), Citizenship
and Its Others (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 98–118 (99).
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rights. Although Muslims soon formed the second-largest religious group in
the FRG, they were not granted equivalent legal recognition as members of
the Christian and Jewish denominations. Mosques were typically built in
backyards of industrial sites and, if religious requirements were accommo-
dated, this occurred with no material or symbolic support from the state.
Although the ‘guest workers’ had a signiﬁcant stake in West Germany’s
post-war economic prosperity, their contribution received little recognition.
Thus, while the FRG rhetorically distanced itself from antisemitism and
nationalism, ethnocentricity remained a prerogative of its politics of
citizenship.
The German Democratic Republic (GDR), meanwhile, dissociated itself
from the Nazi era by positioning itself as an anti-fascist state. Emphasizing
the persecution of members of the Communist Party, the government
refused to take responsibility for the atrocities of its predecessor regime.20
Fascist continuities were, in line with the dynamics of the Cold War, ‘out-
sourced’ in that they were solely attributed to West Germany. While the
latter strategy hardly challenged racist practices, it also entailed an element
of distance in that fascism was projected on to the class enemy. In this vein,
West Germany’s immigration regime was condemned as Nazi-style slave
labour. Yet, the ‘worker’s state’ too was short of a supply of labour, and
thus recruited, albeit in considerably lower numbers, so-called ‘contract
workers’ from fellow socialist countries such as Vietnam, Mozambique,
Cuba, Angola and Algeria in the 1970s. These initiatives were dressed up as
skill-enhancement programmes for the beneﬁt of the workers’ home countries.
As in the FRG, all foreigners were meant to return home and were not granted
citizenship or voting rights. Relations between ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ were
strictly regulated: social and especially intimate contacts were prohibited, and
‘contract workers’ were segregated from the local population in housing and
the workplace. The overall travel ban reinforced the exoticization of foreigners
as ‘forbidden fruits’ that arrived from an inaccessible outside world.21 There
was little accommodation for the workers’ demands; Algerian workers, for
instance, who requested the availability of pork-free meals in the canteen
and time off for prayer, or questioned unacceptable housing arrangements,
were labelled as ‘ungrateful’, ‘belligerent’ and ‘lazy’.22
Thus, despite the divergent framing of ‘labour migration’, both German
states’ politics of citizenship ensured a hierarchical division of labour and
19 Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos, ‘Migrationsregimes in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Zum Verhältnis von Staatlichkeit und Rassismus’, in Demirović and
Bojadžijev (eds), Konjunkturen des Rassismus, 246–67.
20 Behrends and Poutrus, ‘Xenophobia in the former GDR’, 158.
21 Damani J. Partridge,Hypersexuality and Headscarves: Race, Sex, and Citizenship in the New
Germany (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2012).
22 Almut Riedel, ‘Wer guckt auf uns? Muslimische Migranten in der DDR’, Horch und
Guck: Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, 42–5.
Translations from the German, unless otherwise stated, are by the author.
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systematic exclusion from political rights. Both societies treated immigration
instrumentally: the foreigner was to come, do the dirty work, improve eco-
nomic prosperity, not make any claims, not practise a foreign religion in
public and then return home. The politics of citizenship signalled a sense of
superior entitlement for the local population. It suggested that ‘ethnic
Germans’ as sole legitimate occupants of their territory and privileged beneﬁ-
ciaries of the rights accorded to them. This political project added the ﬁgure of
the migrant worker to the ranks of those who had been marked as Germany’s
internal and external Others during colonialism and the Third Reich. By per-
forming an explicit break with and ‘moving on from’ the Nazi state legacy,
both states positioned the Third Reich as the paradigmatic example of racist
practice. They ‘froze’ racism in a speciﬁc period in history and limited
public contestation to one of race’s many incarnations.23
German uniﬁcation
The discontinuation of the GDR, with its totalitarian features, such as its all-
encompassing surveillance, violently enforced borders, travel bans and
biased property rights, initiated a process of economic transformation and
democratization in East Germany. The initial euphoria on both sides was
tainted by the power dynamics of the uniﬁcation process. The passing of a
jointly negotiated constitution was barely seriously debated. The transition
to a capitalist economy evolved on the terms of the FRG. The process dispro-
portionately limited the economic and political agency of the population in the
East over successive generations.
For instance, the Treuhandanstalt, the body in charge of privatizing the
GDR’s 8,500 state-owned companies, sold 85 per cent of the industry to
buyers from theWest and only 5 per cent to former GDR citizens.24 Ownership
regulations privilegedwestern citizens who had lost their property in the post-
war period over compensation claims from GDR citizens. The restructuring of
the public and the private sector brought about high levels of unemployment,
and comparably lower wage and pension rates than in the western regions.
Twenty-ﬁve years on, employment rates and salaries continue to differ.25
Public institutions were restructured, involving a transfer of leadership
responsibility to West Germans. A recent study found that 23 per cent of lea-
dership positions in the eastern regions, including in federal and regional
23 Alana Lentin, ‘Racism in public or public racism: doing anti-racism in “post-racial”
times’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2015, 33–48.
24 Franziska Augstein, ‘Ausverkauf der Republik’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2010,
available online at www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ddr-treuhand-anstalt-ausverkauf-
der-republik-1.137266 (viewed 20 August 2018).
25 Statistisches Bundesamt, ‘25 Jahre Deutsche Einheit: Wirtschaft’, available on the De-
statis website at www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/_Querschnitt/DeutscheEinheit/
25JahreDeutscheEinheit.html (viewed 20 August 2018).
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government, media and educational institutions, are held by people from the
East of Germany, even though they constitute 87 per cent of residents in the
area.26
Thus, signiﬁcant parts of the population, as Naika Foroutan noted, felt that
their East German identity had been depreciated and their skills devalued.27
Democracy had not lived up to their expectations, which fed into a sense of
humiliation, estrangement and alienation from the new Germany. This was
further reinforced through the acceleration of life and insecure working con-
ditions in Germany’s increasingly deregulated neoliberal economy. Signiﬁcant
numbers of young people left the East to take up employment in the West. By
the late 1990s, two-thirds of East Germans thought that West Germany had
‘conquered the East like a colonial power’, and 80 per cent felt like ‘second-
class citizens’.28
The racist ‘peak’ in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, the number of asylum-seekers increased signiﬁcantly as a
result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the dismembering of the Soviet
empire.29 The new arrivals received considerable media attention, and the
government was often criticized for a ‘lack of steering capacity’. German
reuniﬁcation marked the end of post-war occupation, and far-right groups
instrumentalized narratives of a so-called ‘ﬁnally united people’ to revive
German nationalism. They also effectively harnessed the animosities resulting
from the terms of the uniﬁcation process.
Right-wing extremist political parties such as the Deutsche Volksunion
(DVU, German People’s Union), Nationaldemokratische Partei (NPD,
National Democratic Party) and Die Republikaner (Republicans) encouraged
debates on ‘bogus’ and ‘fraudulent’ asylum applicants (Asylbetrüger and
Scheinasylanten) whose main intention was to invade and exploit the
26 Michael Bluhm and Olaf Jacobs,Wer beherrscht den Osten? Ostdeutsche Eliten ein Viertel-
jahrhundert nach der Wiedervereinigung (Leipzig: Universität Leipzig 2016).
27 Naika Foroutan, ‘Nationale Bedürfnisse und soziale Ängste’, in María do Mar Castro
Varela and Paul Mecheril (eds),Die Dämonisierung der Anderen: Rassimuskritik der Gegen-
wart (Bielefeld: transcript 2016), 97–105 (101).
28 Birgit Rommelspacher, ‘Rechtsextremismus in Ost- und Westdeutschland im Vergleich’,
paper presented at the conference ‘Gegen Rechtsextremismus in Ost und West: Andere
Ursachen –Andere Gegenstrategien’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, 18 October 2006,
available on the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung website at http://library.fes.de/pdf-ﬁles/do/
04245.pdf (viewed 20 August 2018).
29 Germany received around 400,000 asylum-seekers and 400,000 emigrants from Central
and Eastern Europe per year. Jochen Oltmer, ‘Als das Grundgesetz geändert wurde’, 16
May 2018, available on the Mediendienst Integration website at https://mediendienst-
integration.de/artikel/asyl-asykompromiss-1993-asyldebatte-asylrecht-ﬂuechtlingskrise-
bundesrepublik-geschichte.html (viewed 20 August 2018).
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German welfare state.30 Their rhetoric resonated in as much as the DVU
managed to win a small number of seats in two regional parliaments in the
former East and two in the former West in this period. Die Republikaner
gained parliamentary representation in Baden-Württemberg and Berlin in
the 1990s.
Neo-Nazi agitation became particularly virulent in the early 1990s, culmin-
ating in a series of arson attacks on refugee shelters. Pogroms against asylum-
seekers occurred in the eastern cities of Hoyerswerda and Rostock in 1991 and
1992, followed by arson attacks against Turkish families in the western cities of
Mölln and Solingen in 1992 and 1993. Neo-Nazi groups had been part of West
and East Germany for decades but they were kept out of the public limelight
in the GDR.31 It was only after 1989, Nitzan Shoshan notes, that neo-Nazi
groups from the West added their ﬁnancial resources, organizational skills
and institutional networks to those of far-right groupings in the East and
physical attacks became a publicly contested issue.32 In the 1990s, the fre-
quency of racist assaults rose across the country, with higher numbers of
such incidents occurring in Germany’s eastern regions.33
Surveys into mainstream attitudes complicate this picture. In 1991 and 1992,
the population in the eastern regions could, more so than residents in the
West, empathize with political refugees and expressed greater openness
towards asylum-seekers.34 The data indicate, however, that far-right tropes
of ‘bogus asylum-seekers’ resonated signiﬁcantly in both East and West:
over 70 per cent of respondents across the country agreed that refugees
‘took advantage of German asylum law’, and a similar proportion supported
changes to the constitutional provisions regulating asylum.35 Respondents in
the West, however, showed higher levels of approval of ‘foreign workers’, and
were not prepared ‘to send them back even if jobs were getting scarce’; in con-
trast, East Germans’ disapproval and preparedness to ‘send foreign workers
back’ rose continuously throughout the 1990s.36 Werner Bergmann and
Rainer Erb suggested that, across East and West, racist attitudes were
30 Werner Schiffauer, Fremde in der Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1997), 75.
31 Harry Waibel, ‘Der gescheiterte Antifaschismus der SED—Antisemitismus, Rassismus
und Neonazismus in der DDR’, JEX: Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische
Kultur, vol. 2, 2016, 40–67.
32 Shoshan, The Management of Hate, 32.
33 Ulrich Wagner, Wolf van Dick, Thomas Pettigrew and Oliver Christ, ‘Ethnic prejudice
in East and West Germany: the explanatory power of intergroup contact’, Group Pro-
cesses and Intergroup Relations, vol. 6, no. 1, 2003, 22–36.
34 Erich Wiegand, ‘Zunahme der Ausländerfeindlichkeit? Einstellungen zu Fremden in
Deutschland und Europa’, ZUMA Nachrichten, vol. 16, no. 31, 1992, 7–28 (22).
35 Ibid., 23.
36 Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, ‘Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus in
Deutschland: Ergebnisse der Einstellungsforschung Mitte der 90er Jahre’, in Wolfgang
Gessenharter and Helmut Fröchling (eds), Rechtsextremismus und Neue Rechte in
Deutschland: Neuvermessung eines politisch-ideologischen Raumes? (Opladen: Leske und
Budrich 1998), 211–24.
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correlated with support for far-right parties such as Die Republikaner, as well
as with the respondent’s overall pessimistic assessment of the economic situ-
ation: the population in the East thereby perceived ‘guest workers’ as rivals in
the labour market.37 Sixty per cent of residents in East and West, however,
agreed that ‘foreigners should adjust their lifestyle more to the German way
of life’.38
Several observations about the racist ‘peak’ in the 1990s are noteworthy:
variations along the East–West axis, especially, were not as straightforward
as suggested. While far-right narratives that frame non-Germans as invaders
of the social security system resonated to a degree, the population in the East
also expressed comparatively higher levels of solidarity with political refu-
gees. At the time, violent attacks against refugee shelters were more frequent
in the East. Across Germany, however, there was a broad consensus that the
liberal asylum regime was in need of reform, and that immigrants should
assimilate better. Neither public debates nor surveys were particularly con-
cerned with refugees’ or migrant workers’ religion at the time; the most
salient markers of difference were ethnicity and culture. That does not mean
that anti-Muslim racism was not already part of the package. Iman Attia’s
qualitative research from the 1990s demonstrates that, if prompted, individual
narratives of personal encounters and relationships could certainly resort to
anti-Muslim racist tropes.39 However, they did not yet play such a prominent
role in mainstream political debates.
The politics of citizenship in post-uniﬁcation Germany
In the years following uniﬁcation, the politics of citizenship was signiﬁcantly
reconﬁgured. In an attempt to ‘re-establish social order’ and ‘preserve dom-
estic peace’,40 various governments gave Germany’s immigration and inte-
gration rules an overhaul. The so-called ‘asylum compromise’ balanced a
liberalization of naturalization requirements for long-term residents with con-
stitutional changes that tightened the conditions of entry for political refugees.
Far-right narratives of ‘self-segregated ghettos’and ‘bogus asylum applicants’,
which, as noted before, resonated with mainstream audiences at the time,
gained further legitimacy by becoming the focus of political reform. Novel eli-
gibility requirements diluted the constitutionally protected right to asylum:
applicants could ﬁle an asylum claim if they did not originate from or had
not travelled through a third ‘safe country’. Legal amendments adopted in
1990, 1993 and 1999 offered long-term residents a right to naturalization
37 Ibid., 213.
38 Ibid.
39 Attia, Die ‘Westliche Kultur’ und ihr Anderes.
40 Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism
(Oxford and New York: Berg 2004), 253–34.
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and granted their children temporary dual citizenship. Evidence of cultural
and constitutional allegiance replaced ethnicity as the entry ticket into the
‘community of value’,41 in that naturalization was made conditional on a
declaration of loyalty to the Federal Republic, and a demonstration of
German-language proﬁciency.42 The legal changes were designed to prevent
the production of an outsider population that harboured foreign attachments,
and to direct political refugees to countries other than Germany. Despite their
liberal impetus, the citizenship reforms perpetuated the logics of race. The
new laws sharpened the boundaries between those who held or could
obtain a right to the territory, and those who were no longer considered
worthy of humanitarian concern. They were indicative of what the govern-
ment considered a pressing social problem and its adequate solution: the erup-
tion of verbal and physical racist violence was addressed by directing
regulatory attention to the movement and conduct of the Other. The
reforms indeed turned out to fulﬁl the desired pacifying effect, as the
numbers of new arrivals declined. Observers noted at the time:
The wave of political violence could be contained once the political institutions
had regained their capacity to regulate immigration, and the police and the
criminal justice system were able to react more adequately to the violence…
Once these decisions had been made, the topic lost signiﬁcance again for a
majority of the population.43
Thus, once the hierarchy between those positively racialized as Germans and
those negatively racialized as refugees had been reafﬁrmed, the mainstream
population’s level of engagement with far-right activists’ arguments and
mobilization ceased, and racist violence declined.
It was a decade into the dissolution of the East–West binary that fundamen-
talist Islamism took centre stage. Once Germany had been identiﬁed as a
harbour for the perpetrators of 9/11, the government’s regulatory attention
turned to Germany’s migrant populations’ religious proﬁle. The politics of citi-
zenship, yet again, was one of the key arenas of legislative activity, and it made
religion more prominent, turning it into a salient marker of racialized alterity.
The conditions of entry to the ‘community of value’ were speciﬁed further in
the 2000s. Participation in integration courses was made a mandatory require-
ment for citizenship acquisition, and naturalization examinations were intro-
duced. The national examination, supported by preparatory tools, such as
textbooks and mock examinations, assessed, among other things, knowledge
of constitutional norms that regulated sexuality and gender. This test, there-
fore, as Schirin Amir-Moazami notes, only aimed ultimately to disqualify ‘dis-
loyal’and ‘illiberal’applicants but actually was designed to educate what were
41 Anderson, Us & Them?, 4.
42 Ibid., 250.
43 Bergmann and Erb, ‘Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus in Deutschland’, 212.
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framed as less-‘civilized’ populations.44 By pitting deviant outsiders against
an in-group who allegedly held up liberal sexual and gender norms by
default, citizenship tests reﬂected and produced hierarchical binaries.45 This
and a much wider array of integration policy initiatives further sharpened
the racialized boundaries of the nation and added a speciﬁc focus on
Muslim religiosity to the regulatory framework.
The politics of citizenship also resonated with the views held by the wider
public.46 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, who traced the popularity of racist and right-
wing extremist attitudes within the mainstream population in a large-scale
longitudinal study, added anti-Muslim items to the questionnaire in 2002.
The ﬁndings indicated that the salience of historic racist repertoires moved
further to the fore when theMuslim presence in Germany became increasingly
problematized. The East–West variation, the data suggest, was signiﬁcant in
that far-right activists successfully appealed to animosities resulting from
the dynamics of uniﬁcation. Between 2002 and 2008, anti-Muslim racist atti-
tudes scored higher in the eastern regions: an average of 21 per cent of the
population in the former West and 34 per cent in the East wanted ‘to prohibit
Muslim immigration to Germany’.47 Sandra Hüpping and Jost Reinecke’s
analysis of these data found that approval of anti-Muslim items correlated
with the perception of relative collective disadvantage in comparison to
other regions.48 Regardless of their actual social status, the more people felt
collectively and comparatively marginalized, feared they could lose their job
and sensed they had less political weight, the more likely they were to
express racist views. A regional breakdown of the data supports my overall
point about the structural features of race; it shows that, once the issue of
‘self-ascribed deprivation in relation to others’ was taken into account, the
difference between East and West became insigniﬁcant: respondents from
more-deprived West German regions approved of racist views on a similar
scale to respondents from economically less well-off East German regions.
Regardless of where they had been raised, those who felt comparably under-
privileged displayed equal levels of resentment. Due to signiﬁcantly higher
levels of economic prosperity in the West, the number was signiﬁcantly
lower there.
44 Amir-Moazami, ‘Zur Produktion loyaler Staatsbürger’, 27–9.
45 Ibid.
46 See, for example, Alexander Yendell, ‘Der Zusammenhang zwischen Regelungen der
Staatsbürgerschaft, nationaler Identität und der Ablehnung von Muslimen’, in Detlef
Pollack, Olaf Müller, Gergely Rosta, Nils Friedrichs and Alexander Yendell (eds),
Grenzen der Toleranz: Wahrnehmung und Akzeptanz religiöser Vielfalt in Europa (Wiesbad-
en: Springer 2017), 111–24.
47 Klein and Heitmeyer, ‘Ost-westdeutsche Integrationsbilanz’, 20.
48 Sandra Hüpping and Jost Reinecke, ‘Abwärtsdriftende Regionen: Die Bedeutung
sozioökonomischer Entwicklungen für Orientierungslosigkeit und Gruppenbezogene
Menschenfeindlichkeit’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.), Deutsche Zustände, Vol. 5 (Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp 2007), 77–101.
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The current anti-Muslim racist ‘peak’
Germany’s response to the humanitarian crisis at the European border in 2015
further polarized this constellation. Chancellor Merkel’s government tempor-
arily suspended the Dublin regulations, and agreed to receive 800,000 refugees
ﬂeeing the Syrian war. This initiative constituted an ad hoc emergency response
negotiatedwith the Hungarian andAustrian political leaderships. The following
debate was highly contentious; while the new arrivals received unprecedented
levels of hands-on assistance and support, they also faced rising levels of political
protest. The atmosphere hardened after the events in Cologne on New Year’s
Eve 2015/2016 and Germany’s ﬁrst experiences with Islamist terrorism in 2016.
Far-right activists and various centrist political representatives linked the
events to a failure to manage immigration, and attributed a particular proclivity
to violence to ‘Islamic cultures’.49 The 2016 ‘Mitte’-Studie recorded a modest
increase in the overall set of right-wing extremist attitudes in that year, but
observed a strengthening of focus on Muslims and asylum-seekers.50 A ban
on the immigration of Muslims, while still more popular in the East, found sig-
niﬁcantly higher approval rates across the whole of Germany. In 2016, 38.15 per
cent of the people living in the former West and 53.82 per cent of the population
in the former East would ‘prohibit Muslim immigration to Germany’, while 50.3
per cent in the East and 49.92 per cent in the West claimed to ‘feel like a stranger
in their own country due to the highMuslim presence’.51 These trends point, yet
again, to the structural anchoring of racism and its successful invocation during
times of heightened immigration.
The right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alterna-
tive for Germany) speciﬁcally began to mobilize around anti-Muslim racist
concerns in late 2015. Alexander Gauland, its co-founder, demanded an
immediate ban on Muslim immigration to Germany.52 The AfD party mani-
festo advocated the permanent closure of the European Union’s external
borders, and called for a ban on ‘symbols of Islamic domination in public’,
such as minarets, as well as on the hijab in the public services.53 The AfD
49 Aleksandra Lewicki, ‘Islamophobia in Germany: national report 2016’, in Enes Bayraklı
and Farid Hafez (eds), European Islamophobia Report 2016 (Istanbul: SETA 2017), 214–36
(219).
50 Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, Eva Eggers and Elmar Brähler, ‘Die “Mitte”-Studie 2016:
Methode, Ergebnisse und Langzeitverlauf’, in Decker, Kiess and Brähler (eds), Die
enthemmte Mitte, 23–66 (45).
51 This is particularly astonishing as 98 per cent of Muslims live in the West of Germany.
Unpublished data from Decker, Kiess and Brähler (eds),Die enthemmte Mitte, presented
by Alexander Yendell in his talk ‘Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment in East
Germany’, at the workshop ‘Islamophobia in Germany: East and West’, University of
Toronto, 18–19 November 2017, 9.
52 Jörg Burger and Jana Simon, ‘Neue deutsche Welle’, Zeit Magazin, no. 52, 5 January
2017, 45.
53 AfD, Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,
Stuttgart, 30 April–1 May 2016, 27, 50, available on the Alternative für Deutschland
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subsequently was seen as the anti-refugee party and parachuted into ﬁve
regional parliaments with double-digit election results in 2016. In the 2017
general election, the party secured 12.7 per cent of the vote and became the
third-largest grouping in the Bundestag. The results indicate a more emphatic
reception of the AfD in the former East, where scores were around and above
20 per cent. Yet, with an average of at least 10 per cent, the AfD also gained a
higher proportion of votes than any other far-right party ever achieved in
post-war West Germany. If we take diverging population sizes into account,
the absolute number of AfD voters is higher in the West. Thus, individuals
who in the past expressed racist opinions but did not vote for far-right
parties now felt that their views were inadequately represented by centrist
parties and supported a platform that explicitly articulated such concerns.54
The ‘Mitte’-Studie also conﬁrmed that approval of anti-Muslim racist senti-
ments directly accounted for support of the AfD.55
Another beneﬁciary of the polarized debate was Patriotische Europäer
gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida, Patriotic Europeans
against the Islamization of the West). Since 2014, the group has re-enacted
the Monday protests that preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall in Dresden.
Chanting ‘We Are the People’, the protesters racialize the line prominently
used in the late GDR’s social movement. Pegida initially gathered up to
17,000 supporters but had become almost insigniﬁcant before it re-emerged
with new force in late 2015. The movement’s main concerns are the failure
of the government’s politics of asylum, a critique of current elites, and anti-
Muslim racist opposition to the public visibility of mosques and hijabs.56 An
important additional theme is ‘West German arrogance’ and the discrimi-
nation against East Germans. While Dresden has remained unique in assem-
bling high numbers of participants, the movement has also inspired local
offshoots across the country, including Magida in Magdeburg, Legida in
Leipzig, Bärgida in Berlin, as well as PegidaMunich, PegidaNRW inDuisburg
and Kögida in Cologne, to name just a few. In 2016, 200 such protests were
registered by the authorities.57 Of these Pegida-inspired gatherings, eighty
took place in the western regions, sixty were organized in the East and sixty
were held in Berlin. Together with the Pegida demonstrations in Dresden,
this adds up to an average of ﬁve protests per week across Germany.
website at www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_
afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (viewed 21 August 2018).
54 Oliver Decker and Elmar Bähler, ‘Vorwort’, in Decker, Kiess and Brähler (eds), Die
enthemmte Mitte, 7–8 (8).
55 Elmar Brähler, Johannes Kiess and Oliver Decker, ‘Politische Einstellungen und Partei-
präferenz: Die Wähler/Innen, Unentschiedene und Nichtwähler 2016’, in Decker, Kiess
and Brähler (eds), Die enthemmte Mitte, 67–94 (82).
56 Piotr Kocyba, ‘Wieso Pegida keine Bewegung harmloser, besorgter Bürger ist’, in Karl
Siegbert Rehberg, Franziska Kunz and Tino Schlinzig (eds), Pegida. Rechtspopulismus
zwischen Fremdenangst und “Wende” Enttäuschung (Bielefeld: transcript 2015), 147–63.
57 Parliamentary Documents 18/8290, 18/9310, 18/10322 and 18/11128 (see note 4).
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Notable with regard to Pegida is that its participants are largely men whose
income and education is above the mean average, and who are disproportio-
nately likely to support right-wing extremist and anti-Muslim racist views.58
The ‘Mitte’-Studie, again, is helpful in disentangling the East–West compari-
son. The survey shows Pegida’s agenda is supported by about a quarter of
the population across the country.59 The East–West variation is marginal:
25.4 per cent of those who live in the former East and 22 per cent in the
former West support Pegida’s political claims.60 Thus, while Pegida operates
particularly successfully in Dresden, the movement also meets with approba-
tion across Germany.
As AfD’s and Pegida’s mobilizations have contributed to the legitimacy of
racist agendas, and violent assaults have occurred with worrying frequency
across the country. Racist violence quadrupled to alarming peaks in 2015
and 2016. Authorities registered 970 assaults targeting refugee facilities and
2,400 attacks aimed at individual refugees in 2016.61 An additional ninety-
one attacks directed at mosques were documented, although the number of
unreported incidents is likely to be signiﬁcantly higher. Of these ofﬁcially
recorded assaults on Islamic religious facilities, twenty-one occurred in the
former East, two in Berlin and sixty-eight in the West of Germany.62 Calcu-
lated against the size of the population, the frequency is relatively higher in
the East. Thus, while Muslims are more likely to be subject to violence in Ger-
many’s East, racist and Islamophobic violence currently occurs systemically
across the whole of Germany.
Several developments are noteworthy with regard to this recent racist
‘peak’. Far-right agitators have successfully exploited the German govern-
ment’s response to the humanitarian crisis with a diverse spectrum of activist
interventions, including electoral mobilizations, demonstrations and physical
violence. Their rhetoric merges the post-war racialization of migrants with
older historic spectres of racism, such as Orientalism. Political responses to
physical and verbal racist violence have so far deviated little from this well-
trodden path. While there is little commitment to safeguarding refugee shel-
ters and mosques that are likely to be subjected to violence, recent German
governments passed a series of measures that further tighten immigration
rules. In 2015 and 2016, for instance, the asylum application process was
58 Alexander Yendell, Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler, ‘Wer unterstützt Pegida und was
erklärt die Zustimmung zu den Zielen der Bewegung?’, in Decker, Kiess and Brähler
(eds), Die enthemmte Mitte, 137–52 (145).
59 Decker, Kiess, Eggers and Brähler, ‘Die “Mitte”-Studie 2016’, 64.
60 Ibid.
61 ‘Proteste gegen und Übergriffe auf Flüchtlingsunterkünfte im vierten Quartal 2016’, 22
February 2017, Document 18/11298, available on the Deutscher Bundestag website at
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/112/1811298.pdf (viewed 21 September 2018).
62 Bundesministerium des Inneren, ‘Schriftliche Fragen der AbgeordnetenMonika Lazar’,
26 January 2017, with covering letter to Monika Lazar, 2 February 2017, available on the
Monika Lazar website at www.monika-lazar.de/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/dokumente/
schriftlichefragen/AW_SF_168_169.pdf (viewed 21 August 2018).
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accelerated, deportations were made easier and integration courses were
opened to refugees. In mid-2018, the government pushed for a further fortiﬁ-
cation of the European Union’s external borders and prepared the passing of
new and tighter immigration legislation. Anne Koch characterized such steps
as ‘well-rehearsed reﬂexes’, in that they re-enact the rationalities of previous
legal reforms.63 These choices contribute to the success of racist populism in
that they are suggestive of the government ‘regaining of control’of Germany’s
borders, the loss of which hadmostly beenmourned by the far-right in the ﬁrst
place.
East and West Germany: united in Islamophobia
This paper revisited research-based evidence and brought together data sets
that provide insight into the virulence of recent racist ‘peaks’ in Germany.
German reuniﬁcation distinctly stratiﬁed German society and reduced the
East German population’s sense of agency. In the 1990s, as today, far-right acti-
vists successfully channelled these animosities into nationalist and racist
resentment. My systematic comparison of far-right activist repertoires, includ-
ing electoral mobilization, protest marches and violent assaults, reveals that
racism, while momentarily resonating more in the East, is not a distinctly
‘eastern’ phenomenon, but reverberates across the whole of Germany. The
occurrence of racist ‘peaks’ in Germany’s recent history, I suggest, do not indi-
cate racism’s cyclical appearance (and subsequent disappearance). They also
do not imply that racist views constitute a ‘mindset’ that is passed on from
generation to generation, across diverging institutional and political settings.
Rather, the regulative attention governments directed towards race in
pursuit of political projects such as colonialism or the building of the Third
Reich structurally and institutionally reproduced and, thus, sustained the
logics of race. In post-war Europe, the political management of immigration
played a signiﬁcant role in reconﬁguring racialized binaries in public life. Its
politics of citizenship, I have argued, provided a key means of perpetuating,
reafﬁrming and cementing racialized hierarchies in past and present
Germany. My analysis shows that both German states claim to have overcome
the legacy of racism, but project and normalize a myth of ethnic homogeneity,
and nurture a sense of superior entitlement in their citizenry. In the Cold War
through to the 1990s, the politics of citizenship operated with ethnocultural
makers of alterity, after which, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, religion became
the focal point of regulatory attention. The regulatory efforts sketched in
this article conveyed and normalized a sense of entitlement among the
German population that could be successfully invoked during periods of
increasing immigration: by far-right agitators but often enough also by the
63 Anne Koch, ‘Blaupausen staatlicher Kontrolle: Die Macht eingeübter Reﬂexe in der
Asylpolitik’, Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, vol. 29, no. 2, 2016, 43–9 (special
issue: Bürgerschaft in Europa, ed. Lewicki).
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political mainstream. Violent eruptions of this sense of superiority have been
contained by directing further regulatory attention to the movement and
conduct of the Other. The tenor of political responses to both ‘peaks’ thus
addressed racist arguments as if they articulated legitimate concerns.
As this article goes into print, statistics point to a continuation throughout
2017 and 2018 of the trends identiﬁed in 2016. While anti-Muslim racism
most explicitly resonates at present with half of the mainstream population
and is translated into multiple forms of action, other historically established
incarnations of race, such as antisemitism, antizyganism and racism against
people of colour, have clearly gained further traction. There is a worrying mis-
match between evidence for the virulence of racism and the lack of recognition
that it constitutes a major challenge to German democracy. Its reduction to a
post-socialist problem of the eastern regions thereby plays a role in masking
everyday racism across the country. The limited resources German govern-
ments have invested in prohibiting and persecuting physical, verbal and insti-
tutional racism, as well as the high levels of attention they have directed at
tightening immigration rules, have also contributed to its legitimacy.
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